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Much could be argued in response to each section of UDOT's brief. However, it 
would be mostly repetitious. The Millers therefore focus only on the following points. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
UDOT argues that Millers have only presented facts that support their position. 
When "reviewing a jury verdict, the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from 
the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Appellee's Brief at 
12. The Millers are not challenging the verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence. 
There was certainly evidence adduced at trial that could be used to support the verdict. 
This is not the issue. Miller's appeal focuses on a number of rulings by the trial court 
that prevented Millers from having a fair trial, including the inability to: (1) present 
relevant and important evidence; (2) explain the absence of critical evidence; (3) have the 
jury properly instructed; and (4) having a fair opportunity to exercise their challenges to 
prospective jurors. 
ARGUMENT - REPLY BRIEF 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS REGARDING THE ACCIDENT 
HISTORY DATA CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE MITIGATING 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE §409 PRIVILEGE 
In its Statement of Facts, UDOT emphasizes that AASHTO's Roadside Design 
Guide only focuses on two factors when deciding whether a median barrier is needed, 
and it "is really a function of median width and traffic volume." Appellee Brief at 15. It 
then emphasizes that the median width where the accident occurred was 40 feet, well 
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within the discretionary 30 to 50 feet where engineering judgment may be used to make 
the decision; however, UDOT ignores the next step of AASHTO's analysis—unless there 
is an accident history. The absence of accident data, therefore, became the pivotal issue 
at trial. 
UDOT's approach to this Court is the same as it approached the jury. It wants to 
focus solely on the initial analysis—median width and traffic volume—because there is 
no evidence of accident history. Therefore, it argues, AASHTO's qualification to the 
initial analysis (accident history) is irrelevant. UDOT's approach is the very reason why 
the trial court's refusal to allow the proposed jury instruction 51 explaining the reason 
why there was no such accident data, was so prejudicial and denied Millers a fair trial. 
UDOT argues that Millers had the accident reports for a period of five years 
before this accident and therefore they were not prejudiced. Here, UDOT is playing both 
sides of the argument. Before trial, UDOT attacked Millers' expert, claiming that 
accident data a few years before the accident cannot form the basis for UDOT's failure to 
install median barriers in the 1995 and 1999 projects. It takes a few years to analyze the 
data, design a construction plan, obtain funding, bid out the job and then complete the 
construction. The recent data is therefore irrelevant. 
By arguing that there was no prejudice because the Millers had five years of data, 
UDOT wants the court to ignore that it was the accident data before 1998 that was the 
critical evidence. Given the inherent delays from the analysis phase to the completion of 
construction, a five year history was simply inadequate and essentially useless to the 
Millers. 
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It is important to note that in the fall of 2002, a year and a half before this 
accident, Daren Duersch became UDOT's Regional One Traffic Engineer for the 
Northern Division. One of the first things he did as a new director was to propose the 
installation of median barriers in the area where the accident occurred and northward. 
UDOT refused to allow Mr. Duersch to explain why he immediately started the median 
barrier project when becoming the Traffic Engineer, asserting the § 409 privilege. 
Because of the inherent delays in completing such a project (preparing the designs, 
obtaining funding, bidding the job, completing the project, etc.), this construction did not 
start until 2005 and the median barriers were not installed until 2006. (R. 2709, pp. 45, 
59-60, 62.) 
The lack of accident data before 1998 affected the Millers' trial strategy. Without 
the jury instruction explaining why the historical data was absent, it would have backfired 
if the Millers tried to use the recent data. Such evidence could not establish the historical 
accident rate applicable to the 1995 and 1999 projects. It would have opened the door to 
arguments about, and focused the jury's attention on, the lack of evidence to support the 
claim that UDOT should have installed the median barriers as part of the 1995 and 1999 
projects. 
The judge had ruled before trial that he would not give the Millers' proposed 
mitigating instruction (No. 51) and ordered UDOT not to take advantage of the privilege 
by arguing the lack of such evidence. Nonetheless, UDOT (subtly during trial and not so 
subtly during closing argument) did the very thing that the trial court instructed UDOT 
3 
not to do. Despite this and the Miller's renewed request, the trial court refused to change 
his prior ruling and give the proposed instruction. (R. 2712, pp. 152, 160.) 
Importantly, UDOT actually produced a 1994 internal memo (see copy attached to 
this brief as Addendum 1, R. 235-236) pursuant to the Millers' initial Request for 
Production of Documents, which verified that the area where the accident occurred had 
an excessively high accident rate, the very thing which AASHTO said would require a 
median barrier if the median width is between 30 and 50 feet. At UDOT's request, the 
trial court excluded this evidence. Knowing that it was contrary to the actual facts, 
UDOT still used the lack of accident history evidence at trial to strongly imply, if not 
actually argue, that there was no accident history. Therefore, UDOT argued, the jury 
should only consider the median width and volume as the determining factors. Through 
this, UDOT used the privilege to perpetrate a fraud on the jury, and the Millers had no 
way to explain the true situation. 
UDOT also argues that the Millers only asked for the accident history from 1996 
forward. This is misleading. Before the judge had excluded the accident history 
evidence and ruled that UDOT did not have to produce any such information, the Miller's 
had served formal discovery requests to obtain all documents relating to applicable area, 
without a time limitation, which would include the historical accident data. See, e.g. 
Requests for Production Nos. 2, 5, and 8 (R. 90, 1360-1362). It was through these 
requests that UDOT inadvertently disclosed the 1994 internal memo verifying a high 
accident rate. 
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The Millers' subpoena to CODES and the noticed deposition of the CODES 
representative were to verify the accident data that went back as far as 1971. (R. 669-
671.) It was the court's ruling that prevented the Millers from seeking and obtaining the 
accident data before 1996. It is simply untrue that the Millers never sought to obtain the 
data before 1996. The accident reports that were held by the Department of Public Safety 
had all been destroyed prior to 1998. The Millers, therefore, could not obtain anything 
earlier than 1998. 
Finally, UDOT emphasizes that the traffic volume was the lowest average daily 
traffic of any section of 1-15 in the area. Appellees Brief at 30. Again, this is misleading. 
The traffic volume was very high even though it may have been the lowest when 
compared to the surrounding areas. The traffic volume in 1995 was 73,755 cars per day. 
(R. 2710, p. 45.) In 2003, the traffic volume was over 90,000 cars per day. (R. 2711, pp. 
208, 210.) The traffic volume considered by AASHTO as the maximum amount was 
only 80,000 cars per day. (R. 2710, p. 38.) 
In any event, the traffic engineer should consider the increase of expected traffic 
volume within the foreseeable future when designing the roadway. (R. 2710, p. 46.) The 
evidence was uncontested that the traffic volume was increasing at a high rate in this area 
of Davis County. (R. 2709, pp. 89-98; 2710, pp. 38-40; and 2711, pp. 215-218.) 
Regardless of the traffic volume, beca use the median width was 40 feet, the 
pivotal issue still involved the accident history. For this reason, the trial court's rulings 
restricting the discovery and use of the historical accident data, its refiisal to give the 
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Millers' explanatory instruction and its failure to prevent UDOT from using the privilege 
as a sword against the Millers claims, denied the Millers a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT - CROSS APPEAL 
L THE JURY INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT 
REGARDING UDOT'S DUTY WAS APPROPRIATE. 
UDOT argues that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 27, specifically 
subparagraphs a and c of the instruction. UDOT takes no issue with the remaining 
language in the instruction. The language of the instruction, when taken as a whole, is a 
fair statement of UDOT's duties. Instruction 27 reads: 
The Utah Department of Transportation had the legal duty to exercise 
reasonable care to: 
a. investigate, analyze and evaluate roadway safety; 
b design and construct a freeway in a reasonably safe condition for 
motorists; and 
c. take reasonable measures to minimize or prevent dangerous 
conditions that would create unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury to motorists. 
Reasonable care means what a reasonably careful government Department 
of transportation would do under similar circumstances. Negligence may be in 
acting or failing to act. The Department of Transportation might be required to 
use more care if it were to understand that more danger was involved in a 
particular situation. In contrast, a department may be able to use less care because 
it would understand that less danger is involved. 
UDOT is correct in arguing that this instruction is more than a simple, general 
statement of the law (which UDOT argues should only be given); however, it is not true 
that the language is an incorrect statement of the law. 
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UDOT's duties originate from statutory language of which UDOT only quotes a 
limited portion in its brief. The relevant language of the statute is quite broad: 
There is created the Department of Transportation which shall: 
(1) have the general responsibility for planning, research, design, construction, 
maintenance, security, and safety of state transportation systems; 
* * * 
(4) plan, develop, construct, and maintain state transportation systems that are 
safe, reliable, environmentally sensitive, and serve the needs of the traveling 
public, commerce, and industry. 
Utah Code Anno. §72-1-201, as amended. Subparagraph (1) is very broad, "have the 
general responsibility for...safety of state transportation systems." Subparagraph (4) is 
similarly broad, "plan, develop, construct, and maintain state transportation systems that 
are safe.... 
UDOT's claimed offending language in Instruction 27 fits well within the 
parameters of the broad statutory duties. In fact, it is difficult to image how the language 
in the instruction would be outside of UDOT's general statutory duties. This is aptly 
illustrated by using UDOT's own statement, "UDOT is obligated only to fix problems 
that it knows or reasonably should know about." (Appellee's Brief at 44, emphasis 
added.) How would UDOT "know" or "reasonably should know" unless it had a duty to: 
"a. investigate, analyze and evaluate roadway safety"? How would UDOT have a duty to 
"fix problems" unless it was required to "c. take reasonable measures to minimize or 
prevent dangerous conditions that would create unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury 
to motorists"? 
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The duty language in the Instruction 27 is couched in terms of reasonableness. 
Moreover, the last paragraph in the instruction further qualifies the duties, "Reasonable 
care means what a reasonably careful government Department of 
Transportation would do under similar circumstances." This language can hardly be 
argued as creating new duties beyond the statutorily mandated duties. 
UDOT's reliance on the single case it cites (which it claims supports its objection 
to Instruction 27), Bramel v. Utah State Rd. Comm % 24 Utah 2d 50, 465 P.2d 534 
(1970), seems misplaced. Bramel involved the appeal from a non-jury judgment in 
plaintiffs favor based on the trial court's finding that the "State failed to give adequate, 
reasonable or sufficient" warning signs for drivers approaching an upcoming danger on 
the roadway. 
The State appealed on two grounds, arguing that the evidence was inadequate to 
support the trial court's finding that: (1) the State was negligent; and (2) the plaintiff 
driver was not contributorily negligent.1 This Court affirmed the judgment and the trial 
court's finding that the State did not properly "discharge its duty of exercising reasonable 
care under the circumstances by placing adequate and appropriate warning signs for the 
safety of traffic using the highway." Id. at 536. 
Bramel did not discuss any jury instruction (there was no jury) nor did it generally 
address the scope or extent of UDOT's duties. Its holding related only to the adequacy 
1
 Under the law at that time, contributory negligence was a complete bar to a negligence 
claim. 
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and appropriateness of the warning signs, an issue that was not present in the case at 
hand. 
Instruction 27 properly instructed the jury regarding UDOT's duties as it related to 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and as set out in Appellant's primary brief, 
Appellants respectfully request the Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and 
remand the case for a new trial. 
DATED this 12th day of May, 2011. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
f)C*' - • , , ,.
 r 
°L. Rich Humpherys/ / /] 
Attorneys for Appellants and ^ 
Cross Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
DATE: April 12, 1994 
TO : Lynn Zollinger, P.E. 
District One Assistant Director 
FROM : Mack 0. Chnstensen, P.E. 
Traffic and Safety Studies Engineer 
SUBJECT: Operational Safety Report 
Project No. IM-15-7 (191 }332 , South Layton to SR-193 (Interstate 
Repair), Davis County 
We have evaluated the accident history for the subject section of SR-15, 
M.P. 332,0-338,0 for the three-year period of 1990 through 1992, with the 
followma results: 
ACTUAL 
INTERSTATE URBAN 1990 1991 1992 TOTAL/AVG EXPECTED 
No, of A c c i d e n t s 108 118 134 360 120 
A c c i d e n t R a t e 1.01 1.05 1,13 1.07 0 . 9 9 
S e v e r i t y 1.41 1.39 1.37 1.39 1.26 
Single Vehicle Ace. (31%) 113 
Side Swipe Ace. (20%) 75 
Rear End Ace. (19%) 71 
Right Angle Ace. (15%) 54 
Accident data indicates that both the accident rate and severity of this 
section are higher than the expected. Out of the 113 single vehicle 
accidents, 92 were of the run-off-road type. Some rear-end accidents and 
all of the right-angle accidents occurred at the 1-15 northbound off-ramp 
with SR-108 (2000 North Antelope Drive). 
We recommend that the following items be considered during design of the 
project to reduce, the number/severity of accidents: 
1. Provide end treatments for concrete barriers. 
2. Flatten out side slopes where needed. 
3. Upgrade delineators. 
4. Provide rumble strips. 
5. Re-do signing. 
6. Inside shoulder width does not meet current standard. 
7. Install backing plates on signals at all interchanges. 
8. Extend barrier protecting structure columns at Hill Field Road 
interchange. 
9. Remove concrete pipe at M.P. 333.60+ (northbound). UDOT Doc's00016 
Source documents a^ e avanaDie di LH« yivi^iun JI iiax^j.^ ^ *~ ^^^^^s „ 
aQditional analysis. If questions arise, please call me at 965-4264. 
MOC/EGonzalez/cdf 
cc: Dave Miles 
Mack Christensen 
Eric Cheng 
Dave Berg 
Duncan Silver, FHWA 
UDOT Doc's 00017 
